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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 
This is an appeal from orders of the District Court 
dismissing, for lack of standing, Count One from each of 
plaintiffs' separate complaints.1 Plaintiffs (collectively 
referred to as "the Building Owners") are owners of 
apartment houses and office buildings in Montgomery 
County, Pennsylvania. They brought their actions under 42 
U.S.C. S 1983 against defendant, the Waste System 
Authority of Eastern Montgomery County ("Waste 
Authority"), asserting violations of their rights under the 
Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, S 8, cl. 3. Specifically, 
the Building Owners challenge the Waste Authority's 
implementation of a waste generation fee ("WGF ") 
structure, which has the purpose of funding a local waste 
processing plant. The Building Owners maintain that the 
Waste Authority's fee structure effectively forces them to 
use the local facility to the exclusion of more affordable out- 
of-state options, in contravention of the Commerce Clause. 
Because we hold that the Building Owners have standing to 





Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, first forayed into 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The remaining counts of plaintiff 's two complaints involved state law 
claims and were dismissed pursuant to stipulated orders dated 
September 12, 2000. The plaintiffs filed notices of appeal from the 
stipulated orders on October 5, 2000. This Court consolidated these 
appeals by order dated October 31, 2000. 
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waste management by developing a municipal plan for solid 
waste disposal that divides the county into three solid 
waste districts, one of which is the Eastern District. 
Approximately two dozen municipalities of the eastern 
portion of the county constitute the Eastern District. In 
1989, Montgomery County established the Waste Authority 
to serve as the municipal authority in the Eastern District. 
 
In implementing its waste management plan, 
Montgomery County contracted with a private company, the 
Montenay Montgomery Limited Partnership ("Montenay"), to 
construct and operate a waste-to-steam plant. In May 
1989, Montgomery County's industrial development 
authority issued $107 million in revenue bonds to finance 
the construction of a waste-to-steam plant that Montenay 
would purchase, build, and operate ("the Montenay 
Facility"). 
 
In order to ensure that the Montenay Facility generated 
sufficient revenue to cover its operations and to repay the 
bonds, Montgomery County, the Waste Authority, and the 
municipalities in the Eastern District enacted flow control 
ordinances. The ordinances required that all solid waste 
produced in the Eastern District be processed at the 
Montenay Facility. In addition, the Waste Authority 
imposed on trash haulers a "tipping fee" to be assessed 
each time the haulers deposited trash for processing at the 
Montenay Facility. The tipping fee was set at a level 
sufficient to cover the expenses and liabilities of managing 
the Montenay Facility, as well as to enable Montenay to 
repay the bonds. As a result of the ordinances and the 
tipping fees, trash haulers were obligated to bring all 
Eastern District waste to transfer stations for later 
processing at the Montenay Facility and to pay an above 
market tipping fee for the waste processing service. 
 
In 1994, the United States Supreme Court decided the 
case of C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New 
York, 511 U.S. 383 (1994), placing the Eastern District flow 
control scheme in jeopardy. The Court ruled that flow 
control systems, such as the one implemented by 
Montgomery County, violate the Commerce Clause. 
Montgomery County responded to C&A Carbone by forming 
a Blue Ribbon Panel in 1997 to devise a new method of 
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ensuring Montenay an adequate revenue stream to operate 
the waste disposal facility and to repay its debt obligations. 
 
In early 1998, the Blue Ribbon Panel recommended that 
the Waste Authority use its governmental power to create a 
waste generating fee structure. On January 1, 1999, the 
Waste Authority adopted the panel's recommendation. This 
new WGF structure differs from the previous flow control 
system in that it transfers the burden of generating revenue 
for the Montenay facility from trash haulers to waste 
generators. Haulers of trash that originated within the 
Eastern District are no longer charged a tipping fee. 
Instead, these haulers are allowed to dump free of charge, 
creating an economic incentive for them to dispose of their 
waste at Waste Authority facilities. The lost revenue from 
tipping fees is offset by the annual WGF that the Waste 
Authority assesses upon property owners in the Eastern 
District.2 As a result, the Building Owners must continue to 
pay private trash haulers to transport their waste, and 
must also pay a new and separate WGF to the Waste 
Authority for the processing of that waste. To cover the 
costs of operating the Montenay Facility and financing the 
bonds, the Waste Authority calculates that it must assess 
a WGF of $76.25 per ton. The Building Owners contend 
that this rate greatly exceeds the interstate market rate, 
which they estimate at $48 to $50 per ton. 
 
The Building Owners allege that the purposes and effects 
of both the abolition of the tipping fee and the imposition of 
the WGF, are to compel them to subsidize trash processing 
at the Montenay Facility, and to encourage trash haulers to 
utilize the Montenay Facility because any other facility 
would require haulers to pay for dumping. They contend 
that under the WGF structure (1) all waste generat ed 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Waste Authority classifies these lands by use and sets the WGF 
at a per ton rate according to the estimated annual tonnage of solid 
waste that a given land classification will produce. For example, the 
Waste Authority charges apartment building owners a WGF for each 
apartment unit, estimating that one apartment will generate 0.72 tons of 
trash annually. In contrast, the Waste Authority assesses office building 
owners a WGF measured by the total square footage of gross floor area 
in the office building. It estimates that offices produce one ton of waste 
annually for every 2000 square feet. 
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within the Eastern District will still have to be disposed of 
in the Eastern District and (2) the Waste Authorit y will still 
force the participants in the waste processing industry to 
cover the expense of the Montenay Facility bonds and its 
operating costs. Finally, the property owners assert that if 
they were to refuse to pay the WGF, the Waste Authority 
could use its municipal powers to impose liens on their real 
property. 
 
Asserting Commerce Clause challenges to the WGF 
structure, the Building Owners brought these actions in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania. The Waste Authority filed motions for 
judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), 
arguing that the Building Owners lacked standing. The 
District Court agreed with the Waste Authority and 
dismissed the actions. The Building Owners appealed, and 
we consolidated the appeals. 
 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We 
exercise plenary review over the District Court's decision to 
grant, on standing grounds, the Waste Authority's Rule 
12(c) motions. See Green v. Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P., 245 
F.3d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 2001); UPS Worldwide Forwarding, 
Inc. v. U.S. Postal Service, 66 F.3d 621, 624 (3d Cir. 1995). 
To that end, we " `view the facts presented in the pleadings 
and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the . . . non-moving party,' " and may affirm 
only if the Building Owners "would not be entitled to relief 
under any set of facts that could be proved" consistent with 
the complaints' allegations. Green, 245 F.3d at 220 (quoting 
Inst. for Scientific Info., Inc. v. Gordon & Breach, Science 




The Building Owners contend that they have a right to 
unimpeded access to the interstate market for waste 
disposal services and that the District Court erred in 
holding that they lack standing. The Waste Authority 
replies that the Building Owners lack prudential standing 
because their claims do not fall within the zone of interests 
protected by the Commerce Clause. It argues that payment 
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of the WGF constitutes, at most, a local injury unrelated to 
the Commerce Clause's purposes of preventing both 
economic protectionism and retaliatory measures between 
the states. We hold that the District Court erred in finding 




We begin by reviewing the basic principles of standing. 
We have previously described standing as a doctrine 
"comprised of both constitutional and prudential 
components." Conte Bros. Auto., Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick 
50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 1998); accord Bennett 
v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997). Elaborating upon this 
description, we have stated that "[t]he constitutional 
component, derived from the Art. III `case' or`controversy' 
requirement, requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that he or 
she suffered `injury in fact,' that the injury is`fairly 
traceable' to the actions of the defendant, and that the 
injury will likely be redressed by a favorable decision." 
Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 225; accord Steel Co. v. Citizens for 
a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1998). The Waste 
Authority does not contest that the Building Owners meet 
these three " `irreducible constitutional minim[a] of 
standing.' " United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742 (1995) 
(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560- 
61 (1992)). 
 
Instead, the Waste Authority argues that the Building 
Owners fail to satisfy prudential standing requirements. 
Prudential considerations constitute a supplemental aspect 
of the basic standing analysis and address concerns 
regarding the need for judicial restraint. See Davis v. Phila. 
Hous. Auth., 121 F.3d 92, 96 (3d Cir. 1997) ("In addition to 
the constitutional standing requirements, federal courts 
have developed prudential standing considerations`that are 
part of judicial self-government.' ") (quoting UPS Worldwide 
Forwarding, 66 F.3d at 626). Prudential standing entails an 
inquiry into a plaintiff 's role because "[t]he aim of this form 
of judicial self-governance is to determine whether the 
plaintiff is `a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of 
the dispute and the exercise of the court's remedial 
powers.' " Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 225 (quoting Bender v. 
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Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 n.8 (1986)). 
We therefore use the prudential limits of standing to ensure 
that only those parties who can best pursue a particular 
claim will gain access to the courts. See Gladstone, Realtors 
v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979). 
 
We have articulated the test for assessing whether a 
party satisfies prudential standing as follows: 
 
       [Prudential limits] require that (1) a litigant assert his 
       [or her] own legal interests rather than those of third 
       parties, (2) courts refrain from adjudicating abstract 
       questions of wide public significance which amount to 
       generalized grievances, and (3) a litigant demonstrate 
       that her interests are arguably within the zone of 
       interests intended to be protected by the statute, rule or 
       constitutional provision on which the claim is based . 
 
Davis, 121 F.3d at 96 (emphasis added) (internal 
quotations and citation omitted); accord Conte Bros., 165 
F.3d at 225-26. In this appeal, the Waste Authority argues 
only that the Building Owners fail to fulfill the third 
requirement, that of the zone of interests. In addressing 
that component of prudential standing, we have advocated 
a "liberal" employment of the zone of interests test, 
explaining that it is "not meant to be especially 
demanding." Davis, 121 F.3d at 98, 101 (internal 
quotations and citation omitted). 
 
Here, we make our zone of interests determination in the 
context of the dormant Commerce Clause. The Commerce 
Clause of the United States Constitution provides that 
"Congress shall have Power . . . to regulate Commerce . . . 
among the several States." U.S. Const. art.I,S 8. The 
Supreme Court has explained that the Commerce Clause 
was not only designed to protect the states, but was also 
"intended to benefit those [individuals] who . . . are engaged 
in interstate commerce. The `[c]onstitutional protection 
against burdens on commerce is for [their] benefit.' " Dennis 
v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 448-49 (1991) (quoting Morgan v. 
Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 376-77 (1946)). While the Commerce 
Clause explicitly confers power to Congress, it"has been 
interpreted to contain `an implied limitation on the power of 
the States to interfere with or impose burdens on interstate 
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commerce.' " Tolchin v. Supreme Court of the State of New 
Jersey, 111 F.3d 1099, 1106 (3d Cir.. 1997) (quoting 
Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization 
of California, 451 U.S. 648, 652 (1981). This implied 
limitation is often referred to as the "dormant Commerce 
Clause." Remarking upon the dormant Commerce Clause's 
role in guarding against arbitrary barriers to trade, the 
Supreme Court has elaborated that: 
 
       every farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged 
       to produce by the certainty that he will have free 
       access to every market in the Nation, that no home 
       embargoes will withhold his exports, and no foreign 
       state will by customs duties or regulations exclude 
       them. Likewise, every consumer may look to the free 
       competition from every producing area in the Nation to 
       protect him from exploitation by any. Such was the 
       vision of the Founders; such has been the doctrine of 
       this Court which has given it reality. 
 
H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 
(1949). The Building Owners contend that such Commerce 
Clause concerns are implicated by the Waste Authority's 
WGF structure, which, they claim, thwarts their ability to 




We agree with the Building Owners. If they succeed in 
proving the allegations of their complaint, they will 
demonstrate that the Waste Authority is forcing waste 
generators to use the Montenay Facility and is forcing them 
to pay a non-competitive fee to use that Facility. 
 
The Supreme Court has held that the Commerce Clause 
is offended by ordinances that "hoard[ ] solid waste, and the 
demand to get rid of it, for the benefit of the preferred 
processing facility." See C&A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392. We 
conclude that, as plaintiffs have alleged, the Montenay 
scheme offends the Commerce Cause in just this manner 
by benefitting the preferred Montenay Facility. Moreover, 
the waste generators are directly involved in this stream of 
commerce. They are consumers of the waste processing 
industry. In paying the WGF, they are directly paying the 
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costs of maintaining the preferred facility and they are 
precluded by economic factors from accessing less 
expensive waste processing facilities. As a result, their 
interests, as consumers of waste processing services, are 
within the zone of interests intended to be protected by the 
Commerce Clause. 
 
Two recent courts of appeals decisions support our 
analysis. In these cases, parties, similarly situated to the 
Building Owners, were held to have prudential standing to 
contest a municipality's waste disposal scheme. See On the 
Green Apartments L.L.C. v. City of Tacoma, 241 F.3d 1235 
(9th Cir. 2001); Huish Detergents, Inc. v. Warren County, 
Ky., 214 F.3d 707 (6th Cir. 2000).3  We find these decisions 
to be persuasive. 
 
In Huish Detergents, Warren County granted a single 
trash hauler a five-year exclusive right to collect and 
process all municipal waste generated in the city of Bowling 
Green. See 214 F.3d at 708. The county obligated the 
hauler to operate the facilities that processed the city's 
waste, effectively prohibiting the use of any out-of-state 
disposal sites. Id. at 708-09. The county required all 
residences, commercial establishments, and industrial 
facilities to utilize the designated hauler's services to 
dispose of their waste. Id. at 709. Huish Detergents, a 
company which operated a laundry detergent 
manufacturing facility, brought a dormant Commerce 
Clause challenge to this waste disposal scheme. Id. The 
Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff had prudential standing 
to litigate its claim because it was asserting its individual 
right as a consumer to purchase processing or disposal 
services across state boundaries, an interest that falls 
"squarely within the zone of interests protected by the 
Commerce Clause." Id. at 711. The court explained that the 
Commerce Clause protects not only producers, but also 
consumers who seek to benefit from free competition across 
the nation. Id. The court concluded by stating that "waste 
generators participate directly in commerce, and the 
Commerce Clause guarantees to them access to the 
interstate market for waste-related services." Id. at 711-12. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We note that the District Court did not have the benefit of these 
opinions, which were rendered after its Rule 12(c) decisions were issued. 
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The following year, the Ninth Circuit decided On the 
Green. In that case, a municipality passed an ordinance 
granting the local solid waste utility a monopoly on 
collecting, removing, and disposing of solid waste in the 
municipality. See 241 F.3d at 1238. The ordinance further 
required that all waste be disposed of at the municipal 
facility. Id. The plaintiff, like the Building Owners here, 
operated a residential apartment complex and brought a 
Commerce Clause challenge because it desired more 
flexibility in disposing of its waste. See id.  at 1237-38. 
Although the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff lacked 
prudential standing to challenge the collection monopoly of 
the ordinance (since collectors would have the possibility of 
using landfills outside the state, obviating Commerce 
Clause problems), it held that the plaintiff satisfied 
prudential standing requirements for challenging the 
section of the ordinance requiring all municipal garbage to 
be dumped at the municipal facility. See id. at 1239-41. 
The court reasoned that because plaintiff 's alleged injury 
would be remedied if it could take its garbage outside the 
city, its injury was related to the purposes underlying the 
Commerce Clause. See id. at 1241. 
 
Like the plaintiffs in Huish Detergents and On the Green, 
we believe that the Building Owners satisfy prudential 
standing requirements because, as waste generators 
participating in commerce and directly affected by the fee 
imposed on them, they allege deprivations of their dormant 
Commerce Clause right to access interstate markets. See 
On the Green, 241 F.3d at 1240-41; Huish Detergents, 214 
F.3d at 710-11. 
 
The Waste Authority suggests, however, that no dormant 
Commerce Clause interest exists here because Montgomery 
County did not ban the Building Owners from gaining 
access to interstate garbage disposal markets, but merely 
imposed a fee. The Building Owners counter this argument 
by pointing out that it fails to consider how the WGF may 
effectively preclude access to the interstate garbage market 
by making it financially unfeasible to access it. This is an 
issue, however, which should be considered not now, as a 
part of our standing determination, but later with the 
merits of plaintiffs' claims. 
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The Waste Authority also asserts that, rather than follow 
On the Green and Huish Detergents, we should be guided by 
earlier Eighth and Ninth Circuit decisions in which waste 
generator plaintiffs, challenging waste disposal ordinances, 
were held to lack prudential standing. See Ben Oehrleins & 
Sons & Daughter, Inc. v. Hennepin County, 115 F.3d 1372, 
1380-82 (8th Cir. 1997); Individuals for Responsible Gov't, 
Inc. v. Washoe County, 110 F.3d 669, 703-04 (9th Cir. 
1997). However, these cases are distinguishable. In Washoe 
County, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the 
individual consumers of trash disposal services did not 
have standing to claim a violation of the dormant 
Commerce Clause because they were not subjected to a 
barrier to interstate commerce, i.e., they had the option of 
disposing of their waste out of state. 110 F.3d at 703-04. 
 
In Ben Oehrleins, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that the waste generator plaintiffs did not have 
standing to protest a cost of waste disposal that was an 
indirect cost, i.e., a cost that was passed on to the 
consumer by the waste haulers. 115 F.3d at 1381. In the 
cases before us, however, the WGF is imposed directly on 
the waste generators.4 
 
The Waste Authority also contends that a finding of 
standing will greatly expand the scope of cognizable claims 
under the Commerce Clause, enabling any individual to 
challenge any state regulation no matter how remote the 
impact upon him or her. That concern is clearly not present 
here, however, because it is undisputed that the state 
regulation involved directly impacts the Building Owners. 
The Waste Authority funds the waste disposal scheme 
through a WGF directly assessed upon each of the Building 
Owners' properties. In challenging the legitimacy of this fee, 
the Building Owners' interests are hardly remote. 
 
We conclude that, because the Building Owners have 
pled that they are unable to freely engage in the interstate 
market for waste processing and disposal services, their 
claims of injury fall within the zone of interests protected by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We do not need to, and we will not, opine here whether we agree with 
the Ben Oehrleins court that waste generators do not have standing to 
complain of indirect costs passed on to them by the waste haulers. 
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the Commerce Clause. Accordingly, we find that the 
Building Owners satisfy the prudential requirements of 




       For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court's Rule 12(c) dismissals, which were premised on the 
Building Owners' lack of standing, and remand these cases 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Although we find that the Building Owners have standing, we express 
no opinion on the merits of their Commerce Clause claims. 
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BARRY, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
I cannot agree with the majority that the Building 
Owners have demonstrated that their interests are arguably 
within the zone of interests intended to be protected by the 
Commerce Clause and, thus, that they have standing to 
bring their dormant Commerce Clause claim. The Building 
Owners did not participate in any interstate commerce 
decision -- where, for example, their waste was to be tipped 
-- and allege only that as a result of the "economic 
disincentives" that result from the zero tipping fee, the 
Waste Generation System interferes with their haulers' 
ability to participate in interstate commerce. It is, they say, 
an "obvious conclusion that the haulers will dispose of 
waste only where there is no tipping fee -- the[Montenay] 
Facility." Third Amended Comp., P 117. As a result, they 
continue, they are effectively compelled to dispose of their 
waste only at that local facility rather than at more 
affordable out-of-state facilities. This is simply not enough 
for a dormant Commerce Clause challenge, and I 
respectfully dissent. 
 
The general dormant Commerce Clause cases as well as 
the more specific waste disposal dormant Commerce Clause 
cases discussed by the majority support my conclusion that 
in-state plaintiffs lack prudential standing to bring a 
dormant Commerce Clause claim where they allege only 
that a party with whom they contract is subject to an 
undue burden on its ability to freely participate in 
interstate commerce.1 In the"general" category, the 
Supreme Court has considered dormant Commerce Clause 
challenges brought by in-state companies whose ability to 
freely contract with out-of-state companies was directly 
infringed by a local regulation. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/ 
Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997) 
(in-state camp subject to state real and property tax waged 
successful dormant Commerce Clause challenge as it was 
the party against whom the tax was assessed and its ability 
to contract was directly burdened); General Motors Corp. v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In this connection, the argument that the haulers here -- who tip 
without payment of any fee -- are "burdened" at all is somewhat hard to 
understand. 
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Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997) (in-state company subject to 
state sales and use tax had standing to bring dormant 
Commerce Clause challenge where it paid the tax and the 
tax scheme affected its contract with an out-of-state gas 
provider); West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 
(1994) (in-state milk producer waged a successful dormant 
Commerce Clause challenge where it was subject to a 
discriminatory tax and was a party to the transactions 
which were burdened). Although standing was not directly 
addressed in Camps and West Lynn, in all of these cases 
the in-state companies were within the "zone of interests" of 
the dormant Commerce Clause because they "sought to 
protect their own rights to purchase goods or do business 
across state borders, without being subject to a 
discriminatory tax." Ben Oehrleins and Sons and Daughter, 
Inc. v. Hennepin County, 115 F.3d 1372, 1381 (8th Cir. 
1997). 
 
Waste disposal cases from courts of appeals which have 
considered the issue have explicitly or implicitly come to 
the same conclusion. See On the Green Apartments L.L.C. v. 
City of Tacoma, 241 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2001); Huish 
Detergents, Inc. v. Warren County, Kentucky, 214 F.3d 707 
(6th Cir. 2000); Individuals for Responsible Gov't, Inc. v. 
Washoe County, 110 F.3d 699 (9th Cir. 1997); Ben 
Oehrleins, supra. In these cases, albeit for different reasons, 
the courts recognized a waste generator's standing to bring 
a dormant Commerce Clause claim where the waste 
generator alleged that its ability to contract directly with the 
hauler or processor of its choice was infringed by local 
regulation. On the Green and Huish Detergents, on which 
the majority relies, are two such cases. Where, however, the 
waste generator did not allege that its ability to contract 
directly with its hauler or processor of choice was infringed 
and instead asserted only that its injury was higher cost in- 
state services or some injury derivative of its hauler's 
injury, the waste generators were found to lack standing. 
Washoe County, supra; Ben Oehrleins , supra. Indeed, the 
On the Green Court relied on Washoe County  when it found 
that the waste generator lacked standing with regard to its 
second claim, i.e. a claim of financial injury merely because 
it was forced to pay for unwanted services. Although the 
courts did not always articulate the importance of direct 
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involvement in the relevant interstate commerce decision 
and injury related to the dormant Commerce Clause, those 
considerations clearly run through each of these cases. 
 
In Huish, for example, the Sixth Circuit held that the 
waste generator who was subject to a local regulation which 
required it to send all of its waste to a designated facility 
had standing because it sought "to protect its right to 
contract with a company that can transport its waste for 
out-of-state processing and/or disposal." Huish, 214 F.3d 
at 710-711 (emphasis added). The Huish Court also held 
that the waste generator's direct participation in the sought 
after out-of-state transaction distinguished Huish from the 
Sixth Circuit's decision in Ben Oehrleins. Id. at 711. In On 
the Green, standing was found as to a waste generator who 
was a self-hauler who alleged that it could not contract 
freely with out-of-state processors but, rather, was required 
to haul only to a city landfill. In contrast, in Washoe County 
and Ben Oehrleins -- and in the payment for unwanted 
services claim in On the Green -- the waste generators who 
lacked standing did not allege any direct participation in 
the subject interstate commerce decision and alleged only 
that they were subject to higher fees because of a local 
ordinance. While I do not contend that this is the only 
difference in these cases, it is a difference, I believe, of 
utmost importance to the standing question. 
 
The Building Owners fall into the latter category. For 
starters, they do not allege that their ability to contract 
directly with the hauler of their choice -- even an out-of- 
state hauler -- is at issue in this case and, unlike the waste 
generators in Huish and On the Green, they are not, as the 
majority suggests, compelled to patronize the local market. 
Rather, the transaction at issue here is the processing 
decision -- where the waste ends up. The Building Owners 
claim that the haulers with whom they contract are put in 
an untenable position when they, the haulers, decide where 
to tip the waste -- "untenable" (although that hardly seems 
the right word) because they tip for free and thus it is 
"obvious" they will tip at the Montenay facility. The Building 
Owners do not allege any involvement in the decision 
making process to determine where their waste is tipped, 
nor do they allege that they seek to become self-haulers 
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and make this decision for themselves. Accordingly, even 
accepting the Building Owners' allegations as true, I 
conclude that any injury they suffer is derivative of their 
haulers' injury and they are one step removed from the 
interstate transaction or decision which is allegedly 
burdened. Their interests, therefore, are too marginally 
related to the purpose behind the dormant Commerce 
Clause for them to have standing. 
 
Nor am I convinced, as the majority seems to be, that the 
Waste Generation Fee itself confers standing on the 
Building Owners. If this case were akin to Camps  or 
General Motors, in which a party involved in the interstate 
decision was assessed a discriminatory tax, I would not be 
writing this dissent. Here, however, the Building Owners 
are merely consumers of hauling services who are subject 
to a flat fee for services they may not or do not want. 
Without even an allegation that they are also parties to the 
transaction or decision they claim is burdened or that their 
ability to contract directly with an out-of-state company is 
adversely affected, the injury of which the Building Owners 
complain is simply not within the zone of interests the 
Commerce Clause was intended to protect. I would affirm. 
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